Introduction
In an economy where a private good can be used to produce a public good, we reconsider the problem of sharing the production cost when negative cost shares are ruled out. This constraint is often imposed in practice; it is unobjectionable if the private good is leisure.
Because …rst-best allocations may not be achievable due to informational or institutional constraints, a complete social ordering of all allocations is desirable: maximizing such an ordering under the relevant constraints delivers a second best solution. Following Maniquet and Sprumont (2004) , we recommend to use the following "public good welfare maximin ordering". Consider an allocation consisting of a level of production of the public good and a list CNRS-CERSES, Paris, and IDEP. Email: marc. ‡eurbaey@univ-paris5.fr. y Département de sciences économiques and CIREQ, Université de Montréal. Email: yves.sprumont@umontreal.ca. 1 of cost shares paid by the agents. The "public good welfare" of a given agent at that allocation is the quantity of the public good that, consumed for free, would leave her indi¤erent to that allocation (Moulin, 1987) . The ordering we advocate ranks allocations by applying the maximin criterion to the distributions of public good welfare levels they generate.
Suppose that negative cost shares are allowed and consider a two-agent allocation where agent 1's cost share x 1 is positive while agent 2's cost share x 2 is negative. In the spirit of the Pigou-Dalton principle, a transfer of private good from 2 to 1 that does not reverse the signs of their cost shares should be regarded as a social improvement. Figure 1 shows that the public good welfare maximin ordering satis…es this "Free Lunch Aversion" property. In the …gure, a transfer of private good from 2 to 1 increases the lowest intersection of the indi¤erence curves with the vertical axis. Maniquet and Sprumont (2004) proved that Free Lunch Aversion combined with two other standard requirements known as Pareto Indi¤erence and Responsiveness force us to use an ordering compatible with the public good welfare maximin principle. Figure 1 When negative cost shares are forbidden, Free Lunch Aversion does not apply. Yet, Figure 2 shows that the public good welfare maximin ordering satis…es the following local version of the axiom. In a situation where agent 1's cost share is positive while agent 2's cost share is zero, a small enough transfer of private good from 2 to 1 is a social improvement. (Note, however, that a transfer leaving 2's cost share smaller than 1's need not yield a better allocation: the transfer must be smaller than in Figure 2. ). We propose a variant of Maniquet and Sprumont's characterization of the public good welfare maximin ordering based on this weak version of Free Lunch Aversion. To …x ideas, we present our result for a pure public good. The straightforward extension to an excludable public good is brie ‡y discussed in the last section.
Setup
There is a …xed …nite set of agents, N = f1; :::; ng; with n 2. There are two goods: one public good and one private good. We denote by z i = (x i ; y) 2 R 2 + agent i's consumption bundle: y is the consumption of the public good, and x i is agent i's contribution to its cost, measured in terms of the private good. All agents consume the same quantity of the public good: exclusion is ruled out.
A preference for agent i is a binary relation R i over R 2 + which is complete, transitive, continuous, strictly decreasing in the private good contribution level x i ; strictly increasing in the public good level y, and convex. The indi¤erence and strict preference relations corresponding to R i are denoted by I i and P i : The set of all preferences is denoted by R. A (preference) pro…le is a list R 2 R N : The set of admissible consumption bundles for an agent with preferences R i is Z i (R i ) = fz i 2 R 2 + j z i R i (0; 0)g: Given a preference pro…le R, an (admissible) allocation z = (z 1 ; :::; z n ) speci…es an admissible consumption bundle z i = (x i ; y) 2 Z i (R i ) for each agent i 2 N . Writing z = (x; y) = (x 1 ; :::; x n ; y); we denote the set of admissible allocations by Z(R) = f(x; y)j(x i ; y) 2 Z i (R i ) for each i 2 N g:
A social ordering for R is a complete and transitive binary relation de…ned over Z(R), the set of all admissible allocations for R: A social ordering function R assigns to each preference pro…le R 2 R N a social ordering R(R) for R. Thus, zR(R)z 0 means that the allocation z is at least as desirable as z 0 from a social viewpoint if the preference pro…le is R: Similarly, I(R) and P(R) denote social indi¤erence and strict social preference.
Axioms for social ordering functions
We impose four conditions on the function R: The …rst one is a weak version of the Pareto principle.
The stronger axiom asking that zP(R)z 0 if z i R i z 0 i for all i and z i P i z 0 i for some i; is not satis…ed by the public good welfare maximin function discussed in the Introduction.
Our second condition is a well known informational simplicity requirement due to Hansson (1973) . The condition weakens Arrow's binary independence: it states that the social ranking of two allocations is insensitive to changes in individual preferences that do not a¤ect the indi¤erence curves at those allocations. Given a preference R i 2 R and a consumption bundle
The third condition is our central axiom. It says that a small enough transfer of the private good from an agent paying nothing to an agent paying a positive cost share is socially desirable. Given two agents i; j 2 N , de…ne t(i; j) 2 R N by t i (i; j) = 1; t j (i; j) = 1; and t k (i; j) = 0 for all k 2 N nfi; jg: The vector t(i; j) represents a transfer of one unit of the private good from j to i.
Weak Free Lunch Aversion. Let R 2 R N ; (x; y) 2 Z(R); and i; j 2 N be such that x i = 0 and x j > 0: For all " > 0 there exists ; 0 < "; such that (x+ t(i; j); y)R(R)(x;y):
A slightly stronger condition would require, under the same premise, that there exist " > 0 such that (x+ t(i; j); y)R(R)(x;y) whenever 0 < ": Both versions are satis…ed by the public good welfare maximin function.
Our last condition requires that social preferences be continuous.
4 Public good welfare maximin
there is a unique level of the public good y 2 R + such that z i I i (0; y): We may therefore de…ne the numerical welfare representation function u(R i ; :) :
The number u(R i ; z i ) is agent i's public good welfare level at bundle z i : The public good welfare maximin (social ordering) function R is de…ned as follows. For any R 2 R N and z; z 0 2 Z(R);
Theorem 1 The public good welfare maximin function R is the only social ordering function satisfying Weak Pareto, Hansson Independence, Weak Free Lunch Aversion, and Continuity.
Proof. It is routine to check that R satis…es Weak Pareto, Hansson Independence, Weak Free Lunch Aversion, and Continuity. Conversely, let R be a social ordering function satisfying these axioms. We prove that for all R 2 R N and z; z 0 2 Z(R),
Continuity then implies that
To prove (1), we rely on the fact that Weak Pareto and Continuity imply the following two properties.
Without loss of generality, suppose min i2N u(R i ; z
Step 1. We derive from the social preference (2) a social preference between two allocations related to z; z 0 at a pro…le related to R. Pareto and Hansson Independence are used repeatedly in this part of the proof. Figure 3 is provided to illustrate the argument in the case n = 2 (to keep the notations of the …gure close to the text, one agent is called n and the other i).
Step
Modify R to obtain a pro…le R 0 2 R N satisfying the following conditions. First, the indi¤erence curves at the allocations z; z 0 are unchanged:
for all i 2 N: Second, the indi¤erence curves of R 0 n restricted to public good levels between y a and y b + ; are parallel to the curve I(R n ; z b n ) within a small distance to the left of that curve. The purpose of this construction will become clear in Step 2, where we perform a sequence of private good transfers from agent n to the others. Formally: for each (x; y) 2 R + [y a ; y b + ]; let d(x; y) be the number such that (x + d(x; y); y) 2 I(R n ; z b n ); de…ne Z = f(x; y) 2 R + [y a ; y b + ] j 0 d(x; y) g, and choose > 0 small enough that I(R n ; z a n ) \ Z = ;: For all (x; y); (x 0 ; y 0 ) 2 Z ; let
Observe that I(R n ; z a n ) \ Z = ; implies that z a n P 0 n (x; y) for all (x; y) 2 Z : Third, the indi¤erence curves of all other preferences have a positive slope at (0; y a ): Using straightforward notation,
By (2) and Hansson Independence,
Step 1.2. Let = min i2N nn s(R 
Next, let R 000 2 R N be a pro…le such that R for all i 2 N nn: These requirements are consistent because : By (4) and Hansson Independence,
Step 2. We use Weak Free Lunch Aversion, together with Pareto and Continuity, to derive a contradiction to (5).
Step 2.1. Let Z c denote the set of allocations z = (x; y) 2 Z(R 000 ) such that (i) zR(R 000 )z c ; (ii) y a + " y y b + "; (iii) (x i ; y)R 000 i (0; y a + ") for all i 2 N nn and x i = 0 for some i 2 N nn;
The set Z c is nonempty since it contains z c : It is compact by Continuity. Let z = (x ; y ) 2 Z c be such that y y for all (x; y) 2 Z c : We claim that y = y a + ": Suppose that y > y a + ": By (iii), x i = 0 for at least one agent i 2 N nn: Applying Weak Free Lunch Aversion as many times as there are such agents, there exists x such that
and (x;y )R(R 000 )(x ; y ):
i (x i ; y ) for all i 2 N and x 0 i = 0 for some i 2 N nn: Since preferences are strictly monotonic, y 0 < y : We claim that (x 0 ; y 0 ) 2 Z c ; contradicting the de…nition of (x ; y ):
By Pareto Indi¤erence, (x 0 ;y 0 )I(R 000 )(x;y ): It follows that (x 0 ;y 0 ) R(R 000 ) (x ;y ) R(R 000 ) z c ; hence (x 0 ;y 0 ) satis…es (i). In view of (6), (x 0 ; y 0 ) satis…es (ii) and (iii). Since (x ; y ) 2 Z c ;
d(x n ; y ) X i2N nn
and since s(R 000 i ; (0; y 0 )) for all i 2 N nn;
Because the indi¤erence curves of R 000 n are parallel over the relevant region,
Combining this equality with inequalities (7), (8),
that is, (x 0 ; y 0 ) satis…es (iv), completing the proof that (x 0 ; y 0 ) 2 Z c : This is the announced contradiction; we conclude that y = y a + ": Since y = y a + " and y b y a = ; conditions (iii) and (iv) applied to z = (x ; y ) give x i = 0 for all i 2 N nn and d(x n ; y ) (n 1) :
Step 2.2. Let Z denote the set of allocations z = (x; y) 2 Z(R 000 ) such that (i) zR(R 000 )z ; (ii) y a y y a + "; (iii) (x i ; y)R 000 i (0; y a ) for all i 2 N nn and x i = 0 for some i 2 N nn; (iv) d(x n ; y) P i2N nn x i + (n 1)( + y a +" y ):
Again, this set is nonempty and compact. Letting z = (x ; y ) 2 Z be such that y y for all z = (x; y) 2 Z ; it is straightforward to mimic the argument in Step 2.1 (this time, using the fact that s(R 000 i ; (0; y)) for all i 2 N nn and y a y < y a + ") to show that y = y a : Conditions (iii) and (iv) applied to z = (x ; y ) give x i = 0 for all i 2 N nn and d(x n ; y ) (n 1)( + " ):
Since 2 (n 1) and " 2(n 1) ; we get d(x n ; y ) : Recall from Step 1.1 that this implies z a n P 0 n z n ; and since R 000 n = R 0 n ; we have z a n P 000 n z n : Pareto implies
and, since z R(R 000 )z c and z R(R 000 )z ; by transitivity, z a R(R 000 )z c , the announced contradiction to (5).
Discussion
1) The following examples show that our axioms are independent.
i) The social ordering function recommending indi¤erence between all allocations at all preference pro…les satis…es all axioms in Section 3, except Weak Pareto.
ii) Let L R be the subset of linear preferences: each R i 2 L is characterized by a positive number
The function R satis…es all our axioms but Hansson Independence.
iii) To construct a function R satisfying all axioms but Weak Free Lunch Aversion, we begin with a remark. Let f : R + ! R + be a strictly increasing function and de…ne, for each R i 2 R, a welfare representation function v(R i ; :) :
We say that the welfare representation procedure v is equivalent to the welfare representation procedure u: Clearly, the social ordering function R de…ned by zR(R)z 0 , min i2N v(R i ; z i ) min i2N v(R i ; z 0 i ) for all R 2 R N and z; z 0 2 Z(R) is the public good welfare maximin function R :
To obtain the desired example, choose a continuous welfare representation procedure v that is not equivalent to u; and apply the maximin criterion to the welfare distributions generated by the allocations. For instance, let v(R i ; z i ) = y , z i I i (1=y; y) (i.e. v measures the vertical coordinate of the intersection between the indi¤erence curve and the hyperbola of equation x = 1=y); and let zR(R)z
N and z; z 0 2 Z(R). iv) Finally, the public good welfare leximin function (Maniquet and Sprumont, 2004 ) satis…es all our axioms but Continuity. That social ordering function agrees with the maximin function whenever the latter expresses a strict preference between two allocations. For a more radically di¤erent example, consider the following function R: For all R 2 R N and z; z 0 2 Z(R); let zR(R)z 0 if and only if either
2) Contrary to Maniquet and Sprumont (2004) , we use Weak Pareto and Hansson Independence instead of Pareto Indi¤erence (de…ned in the proof above) and Responsiveness (which says that the relative ranking of an allocation with respect to another is not worsened if the upper contour sets of the agents shrink at the bundles of this allocation and expand at the other). This di¤erence is inessential and Maniquet and Sprumont's result holds with either combination of axioms. Hansson Independence is logically weaker than Responsiveness, and Weak Pareto is usually considered more intuitively compelling than Pareto Indi¤erence, although under Continuity, Weak Pareto implies Pareto Indi¤erence as recalled in our proof.
Another slight di¤erence between the two papers is that our Weak Free Lunch Aversion axiom only requires weak social preference whereas Maniquet and Sprumont's Free Lunch Aversion requires strict preference for the post-transfer allocation. This di¤erence is connected to the other because with an axiom requiring only weak social preference, Pareto-Indi¤erence and Responsiveness do not permit to exclude universal indi¤erence as a possible social preference. Maniquet and Sprumont show that Pareto Indi¤erence, Responsiveness and Free Lunch Aversion imply Weak Pareto. With a variant of our Weak Free Lunch Aversion requiring strict preference, we can prove a similar result (with a similar argument, which we omit here). This implies that with this variant of Weak Free Lunch Aversion, we could replace Weak Pareto and Hansson Independence by Pareto Indi¤erence and Responsiveness and still obtain our result.
3) Finally, we provide a brief explanation of the claim made in the Introduction that our result extends to the case of a public good with exclusion. When a nonrival good is excludable, agents may consume di¤erent quantities of the good. By Pareto Indi¤erence, and thanks to monotonicity and convexity of preferences, one can always …nd an equivalent allocation in which all agents consume the same quantity of the nonrival good. Therefore, with just this additional step, our proof shows that the public good welfare maximin function is the only one satisfying the axioms in this extended setting, even when the Weak Free Lunch Aversion axiom is written so as to apply only to allocations in which all agents consume the same quantity of the nonrival good.
